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This study separates trading volume into buyer- and seller-initiated activities and examines the 
directional volume reaction in small and large trades to different types of earnings news. ‘Good’ 
(‘bad’) news triggers brief, but intense, buying (selling) in the large trades. However, a persistent 
period of unusually high buying activity is observed in the small trades irrespective of the news. This 
anomalous proclivity of small traders to buy is robust across firm size, trading volume, and different 
earnings expectation models. Several explanations are discussed, although the behavior does not 
seem fully explained by existing theories. 
1. Introduction 
This study investigates the intraday behavior of directional volume surround- 
ing the release of different types of earnings news. In prior studies of earnings 
news and trading volume, the volume metric is a nondirectional, and the 
appropriate interpretation of abnormal volume has been a subject of debate.’ 
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A recent study by Lee and Ready (1991) notes that most trades take place when 
one side of the transaction (a buyer or seller) demands immediate execution. 
Thus, it is usually possible to classify each trade as either buyer- or seller- 
initiated. In this paper, the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is used to decom- 
pose abnormal volume into buyer- and seller-initiated trades. This approach 
permits the buy/sell reaction of investors to be directly observed, so that 
directional inferences may be drawn from the volume reaction of different types 
of earnings news. 
When volume is decomposed in this manner, new insights into investor 
behavior emerge. For example, the buy/sell imbalance immediately before 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ news releases is a measure of the extent of pre-announcement 
information ‘leakage’. Similarly, the duration and adjustment path of the 
buy/sell imbalance after an earnings announcement provide new insights into 
how quickly market participants (as opposed to prices) adapt to the new 
equilibrium price. 
This study uses the directional volume metric to examine the differential effect 
of earnings news on the instigators of small (low dollar value) and large (high 
dollar value) trades. The results show that in the pre-announcement period there 
is little abnormal volume and little evidence of information ‘leakage’, in that the 
proportion of buys (sells) is not significantly higher just before good (bad) news. 
In the half hour of the announcement, both small and large trades experience an 
abrupt increase in volume, which is sustained for several days. The volume 
reaction in small trades is ‘weaker’ than the reaction in large trades, in the sense 
that the abnormal volume in small trades represents a lower proportion of total 
trading for that size class. Consistent with Cready’s (1988) analysis at the daily 
level, I find the small trade reaction to be ‘slower’ and, in addition, show that this 
derives mainly from the greater concentration of large trades in the first hours 
after the Broad Tape announcement. 
In the post-announcement period, I find large trades respond to good (bad) 
news by a period of intense buying (selling) of short duration. The speed of 
adjustment in the large trade buy/sell imbalance mirrors the speed of the 
intraday price adjustment, such that both are largely undetectable after the first 
hour of trading. Thus, buys and sells in large trades quickly settle around the 
new equilibrium price. In contrast, the small trades display a puzzling propen- 
sity toward buys during earnings announcement periods irrespective of the type 
of news release. This abnormally high buying activity is robust across different 
earnings expectation models, and is found even in a sample of ‘neutral’ news 
releases. The persistent buying in small trades is also observed for subsample 
portfolios formed on the basis of firm size and trading volume, although it is 
more evident in smaller and less frequently traded firms. Alignment of the events 
by time-of-day shows that the small trade abnormal buying begins the day 
before the earnings release and is most intense on the morning after the Broad 
Tape news has been released. This surprising proclivity of small trades to be 
C.M.C. Lee, Earnings news and small traders 267 
buys around earnings announcements does not seem fully explained by existing 
theories. 
One interpretation of these findings is that small individual investors and 
professional/institutional traders differ systematically in their reaction to earn- 
ings news. The evidence on individual and institutional trades suggest a link 
between trade size and trader type. Even though trades below $10,000 represent 
nearly 50% of the transactions for NYSE firms, Chen and Lakonishok (1991) 
show that few institutional trades are below $10,000.2 In contrast, the 1985 
NYSE Shareownership Survey reports that the median transaction size for 
various subgroups of individual investors ranged between $2,300 and $8,540. 
Thus, if individual investors differ from their professional counterparts in terms 
of trading behavior, this difference should be reflected in the trade size proxy. 
Extant evidence, primarily from surveys, shows individual investors trade much 
less often, spend far less time on investment analysis and typically rely on a very 
different set of information sources from their professional counterparts.3 This 
study posits that small traders will respond differently from large traders to the 
same earnings signal. The evidence is consistent with this hypothesis.4 
The paper is related to several recent studies in finance and accounting. In 
finance, the focus has been on the potential pricing effect of individual investors. 
For example, Ritter (1988) observed that the daily buy/sell ratio for Merrill 
Lynch cash account clients (a noninstitutional clientele) explains 40% of the 
year-to year variation in the ‘January Effect’ - the tendency of small firms to 
outperform the market in January. Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) report an 
association between the ‘Weekend Effect’ - negative returns on Mondays - and 
the buy/sell ratio in odd-lot trades. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) show that 
fluctuations in the discount of closed-end mutual funds (held primarily by 
noninstitutional traders) track abnormal returns on small firms, and activities in 
other market segments dominated by individual investors (such as initial public 
offerings and net redemptions on open-end mutual funds). In each case, the 
‘Chen and Lakonishok (1991) has unique dataset of 1.2 million known institutional trades 
transacted between 1986 and 1988. The median trade is $80,000 and only 10% of these trades is 
below $10,000. Unfortunately it is not known whether these trades arise from market or limit orders. 
If a significant percentage were limit orders, it is possible the reported trade size (which reflects the 
active side of the trade) is smaller than the size of the original order. Thus, the percentage of 
institutional trades below $10,000 is likely to be at most 10%. 
-‘Evidence on trading frequency can be derived from ownership and volume information provided 
by NYSE Shareownership Surveys as well as the Securities Industry Association Investor Activity 
reports, Evidence on decision styles and information sources is presented in Lease, Lewellen, and 
Schlarbaum (1974). Lewellen, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1977), Yunker and Krehbiel (1988) Shiller 
and Pound (1989). and the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) (1987) survey. 
4The small and large trader interpretation motivates this study and seems reasonable, given the 
collaborating evidence on individual and institutional trades. However, other explanations for these 
results are possible and some are discussed in the concluding section. As a minimum, these results 
suggest some traders are behaving differently from others - a finding that should be of interest even 
apart from the individual/institutional interpretation. 
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differential behavior of small individual investors is offered as a potential 
explanation for a long-standing pricing anomaly. 
A maintained hypothesis in these studies is that the buy/sell activities of small 
individual investors do not always correspond to those of large institutional 
investors - ‘small money’ does not move in lockstep with the ‘big money’. 
Surprisingly, this hypothesis has never been tested directly using trade size 
proxies. In this paper, the issue is addressed in the context of a specific 
information event - earnings news. Divergent buy/sell reactions in large and 
small trades to the same earnings signal is at least consistent with the institu- 
tional/individual dichotomy hypothesized in these studies. 
Two recent studies in accounting also provide additional insights on the issue. 
Cready (1988) finds that the abnormal volume reaction to announcements of 
earnings is weaker and slower in small trades. Cready attributes these findings to 
a positive relation between investors’ wealth and the value of earnings informa- 
tion. In contrast, Cready and Mynatt (1991) show no significant volume reaction 
to the mailing of annual reports except in the smallest trade size stratum. Taken 
together, the evidence suggests small trades respond to different information 
signals from large trades. This study extends Cready (1988) by contrasting the 
directional reaction of small and large trades in an intraday framework. The 
buy/sell decisions of small and large traders are linked explicitly to ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ news earnings as defined by different earnings expectation models. The 
findings show directional differences in the small and large trades even to the 
same information signal. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses 
relevant market microstructure research design issues. Section 3 deals with data 
description and sample selection, section 4 covers statistical tests, and section 
5 reports results. Section 6 summarizes the key findings and potential explana- 
tions and offers suggestions for future work. 
2. Market microstructure and research design 
The rules and procedures that govern the way orders are executed on the 
exchange floor can have a significant effect on the inferences made using 
intraday data. Two market microstructure issues, in particular, have important 
implications for the design of this study: the behavior of passive side traders and 
the credibility of the small trade proxy for individual investor behavior. These 
two issues are discussed in this section. 
2.1. Passive side activities 
Trading in equity securities on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) generally involves a continuous two-sided 
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auction5 The trading process for each security is carried out at a specified 
location on the exchange floor and presided over by a specialist. 
When an order is placed with a broker, the instigator of the order specifies not 
only the number of shares to be bought or sold, but also the mode of execution. 
A market order is to be executed immediately at the best available price. A limit 
order is an order to buy or sell when a specified price is attained (limit orders 
which are immediately executable are, in this context, considered to be market 
orders). The specialist maintains a list of limit orders at various prices on each 
side of the current quote. These orders are executed as prices move to the level 
specified in the order. When an order is large, it is sometimes more advanta- 
geous for a trader to issue a ‘standing’ order. A standing order is an order to buy 
or sell certain number of shares at the best available price over a certain time 
period. The order is given to a floor broker who is able to exercise discretion 
over the exact timing of the trades needed to fill the order by waiting in the 
‘crowd’ at the specialist’s post and responding to incoming orders by bettering 
the current quote. In terms of immediacy of execution, the market order is 
executed immediately, the standing order is like a limit order with priority 
execution and the limit order is only exercised when price conditions dictate. 
In this setting it is possible to identify a passive and an active side to each 
trade, with the active side defined as the side with the greater need for immediate 
execution. This is because after the opening trade, trading only takes place when 
a market order arrives.6 The market order (the active side) is met either by 
a standing order or a limit order, or the specialist trading on his or her account 
(the passive side). With few exceptions, both the size and direction of a trade 
reflect the market order, or the active side, of the transaction. For example, when 
a larger market order is filled by several smaller limit orders (and possibly in 
part by the specialist), the transaction is recorded as a single transaction at the 
size of the market order.’ 
Note that the trade size proxy captures only one dimension of the market - 
the activities of the active side. The trade size proxy does not reflect any changes 
which might occur on the passive side as a result of an information release. 
However, the active side should be the dimension of primary interest when 
studying the effect of public disclosures (i.e., event studies). This is because the 
active side reflects the behavior of market participants who demand immediate 
5The exceptions are the opening trade of each day (which is a single call auction) and certain block 
trades (which are prearranged away from the exchange floor). 
60ccasionally, a market buy and a market sell order will arrive simultaneously and be matched 
with each other, but this situation is rare. 
‘The exception is when there is insufficient depth at a given price, in which case a separate trade is 
recorded at each price level needed to fill the order. This would result in the original order being 
recorded as more than one smaller trade. Even in such situations, the smaller trades reflect the depth 
at a given price, not the size of the limit or standing orders which make up the passive side. 
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execution. When an investor receives information that causes a revision in her 
beliefs about the value of a security, and she believes this information will cause 
a general price movement in the same direction, the appropriate action is to 
issue a market order - not a limit or standing order. Only a market order 
ensures execution as the price moves in the direction expected. A limit or 
standing order to buy at the bid price, for example, will not be executed at all if 
the investor is correct and the price moves upwards. 
2.2. The small trade proql 
Any proxy for individual investor behavior based on trade size is inherently 
noisy. Some individual investors are capable of trading in volumes that are 
indistinguishable from professional investors. Other institutional investors 
might choose to trade in smaller blocks for strategic reasons. The approach 
taken here is to minimize the possibility of institutional activity in the small 
trades by selecting a low value threshold. This enhances the interpretability of 
the small trade proxy at the cost of losing the larger transactions made by 
individual investors. 
Since small traders are defined in terms of the value of their investment base, 
a dollar-based threshold for classifying trades is most logical. Unfortunately 
a simple dollar-based classification scheme is sensitive to price movements and 
runs into implementation problems due to the discrete trading of shares in 
round lots of 100.8.9 An alternative is to use a share-based proxy, such as in 
Cready (1988). Unfortunately a share-based proxy is difficult to interpret in 
a wealth context since securities can trade in a wide price range. 
To circumvent these problems, the small trade proxy for each firm was 
computed as follows: 
1. Obtain the closing price of the firm as of December 30, 1988. 
2. Compare the closing price to $10,000 and determine the largest number of 
round lot shares that is less than or equal to $10,000. Trades transacted 
during the year for this firm at this number of shares or less will be deemed 
small trades. 
‘The transaction data used does not separately identify odd-lot trades (transactions of less than 
100 shares). During the study period, the total value of odd-lot trades is 0.7% of the total value of all 
shares transacted (NYSE Fact Book, 1988 edition). 
‘The problem with a simple dollar-based proxy is that price movements will cause different 
round-lot trades to be classified as ‘small’ trades. For example, if a stock is trading at $29, a $10,000 
cutoff would classify all trades of 100-500 shares as small trades. If the stock moves to 208, suddenly 
only lOC~400 share trades will be classified as ‘small’. Since small traders are not likely to 
immediately adjust the size of their trades due to such small price changes. we will observe an 
immediate drop in the small trade volume which is artificially induced. 
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For example, if the year-end price of a share is $30, then all trades for this firm 
involving 300 shares or less will be deemed small trades. Similarly, for a $40 
stock, all trades of 200 shares or less will be deemed small trades. During 1988, 
year-end prices were generally close to their high for the year so virtually all 
trades classified as small trades by this method should be below $10,000. 
Descriptive statistics presented later bears this out. 
The $10,000 threshold was selected after examining the findings of the NYSE 
Public Transactions Study (PTS) and the NYSE Shareownership Survey.” It 
ensures the small trades will have little institutional activity yet still contain 
enough observations (45% of all trades) to provide statistical power comparable 
to the large trade stratum. Ideally, the trades should be divided into several size 
categories. However, the frequency of trades in half-hour intervals is too low to 
permit finer partitions without a substantial decrease in statistical power. To 
ensure the main findings are not sensitive to this threshold value, all major 
findings were recomputed using $5,000 and $20,000 cutoffs (a disadvantage of 
the $5,000 threshold is that any firm with a trading price higher than $50 will 
have no small trades). The results were qualitatively identical. 
Apart from the assumptions already discussed, there are two other sources of 
potential noise in the small trade proxy: batching of small trades in the opening 
trade of each day and the effect of program trading. The former is controlled for 
by excluding from the analysis the first trade of each day which is not preceded 
by a BBO-eligible quote. l1 The increased volatility in the volume measures 
introduced by programmed trading activities has the potential to diminish the 
power of statistical tests. However, during 1988 most programmed trades relate 
to index arbitrage activities between the futures and equity markets. This 
activity is not firm-specific and is not correlated with earnings announcement 
dates, so program trades should not bias the results in this study. 
“The PTS is an extensive survey of trades transacted on the NYSE. The last PTS was conducted 
during the fourth quarter of 1980. That study shows that in the 900 shares or less size stratum, 70.5% 
(29.5%) of the publicly traded volume is due to trades by individual (institutional) investors. In the 
1,000 shares or more stratum, 23.7% (76.3%) of all trading volume is individual (institutional). 
While the average shares per trade in the fourth quarter of 1980 was 762, orders initiated by 
institutional investors averaged 1,700 shares and orders initiated by individual investors averaged 
374 shares (these are means, the medians should be lower). As an alternative frame of reference, the 
1985 NYSE Shareownership Survey attempts to profile the individual investor. That report finds the 
median transaction size for various subgroups of individual investors (classified by age, experience, 
etc.) ranged between $2,300 and $8,540. 
“Quotes which are eligible for inclusion in the National Association of Security Dealer’s best bid 
or offer calculation are call BBO-eligible quotes. Mv discussion with NYSE specialists indicate 
opening trades which precede a BB&eligible quote-generally reflect a clearing of accumulated 
orders. On the other hand, a trade which takes place after an opening quote has been established is 
generally not a clearing trade. 
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3. Data description and sample selection 
The transaction data used for this study were obtained from the Institute for 
the Study of Security Markets (ISSM) based at Memphis State University. The 
ISSM data includes information on all firms whose primary exchange listing is 
the NYSE or the AMEX, although only NYSE firms were selected for this study. 
All trades and quotes originating from the NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ, or one of 
the regional exchanges are included. Each trade or quote is time-stamped 
(nearest second) and carries a code identifying the originating exchange. For 
trades, the price and volume is provided, as is a condition code if special 
conditions apply. For quotes, the bid price, ask price, depth on both sides, and 
a condition code (where applicable) are provided. 
The period of coverage of the tape used in this study is the twelve-month 
period January 4, 1988 to December 30, 1988 - 253 trading days. During this 
period the exchanges opened for 6.5 hours a day (9:30 to 4:00 EST, except the 
Pacific Exchange which operated at a half hour later). All trades between 9:30 
and 4:15, including trades on regional exchanges, were included in this study. 
The reason for extending the closing time for 15 minutes is to pick up the trades 
which are time-stamped slightly later than 4:00, due to market-at-close orders, 
etc. This procedure picked up all but 2,525 trades (0.06% of the total transacted 
by the sample firms). A review of these trades showed they were either related to 
activity on the Pacific Exchange or were reported late. When volume by time 
intervals were computed, trades with transaction times between 4:00 and 4:15 
were included in the last trading period of the day. 
The sample firms included in this study were selected from the 1988 
ISSM transaction tape. The initial population consisted of all NYSE-listed 
common stock issues with a CUSIP identifier that were listed for the full 
year. This resulted in 1,463 firms. To facilitate the analysis, a series of restric- 
tions on shares outstanding, trading activity, and price were imposed on these 
firms. 
Table 1 details these filters and the number of firms that were removed 
through the sequential application of each filter. 604 firms remained after these 
filters. Due to cost considerations, a random sample of 302 firms was selected 
from this remaining population. After removing all regulated firms (utilities) and 
firms in specialized industries (closed-end funds and investment trust funds), 
a total of 230 firms remained. 
For each firm, the date and time of all announcements of dividend changes 
and quarterly earnings were identified by searching the Dow Jones News Service 
(DJNS) for the period January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1988. The earnings 
announcement selected for analysis is the first announcement after the period 
end that provided an actual earnings figure. Occasionally an announcement 
would be corrected at a later time. In such cases the earlier announcement time 
is used. In light of earlier findings of abnormal volume and price effects around 
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Table 1 
Selection of sample firms.” 
Total NYSE firms listed for the full year in 1988 1,463 
. Change in shares outstanding > 10% 332 
l Extreme large block trades 38 
l Trading halts 228 
. Averaged less than 10 trades per day 216 
. Year-end price < $5 or > $100 45 
Total remaining firms 604 
Firms in a 50% random sample 302 
Less: Firms in specialized or regulated industries 72 
Total sample firms 230 
“The sample selection criteria in the order applied were: 
Change in shares outstanding > 10% -Substantial changes in the total shares outstanding will affect 
the volume statistics as well as the small trade proxy, thus issues for which the total shares 
outstanding changed by more than 10% during the year are removed. 
Extreme block trades - Firms that experienced a trade exceeding 3.276 million shares are removed 
since the effect of such a trade will likely distort trading patterns not only in the vicinity of the trade 
but also after its occurrence. The size of the cutoffreflects the ISSM tape definition ofextreme trades. 
Trading halts - The trading on a security may be temporarily suspended for the dissemination of 
news or when a severe imbalance of buy/sell orders occurs. While not a common occurrence, these 
trading halts have a disproportionately large effect on intraday trading patterns. King, Pownall, and 
Waymire (1991, forthcoming) show very few halts are related to earnings announcements. 
Low volume - Issues that are very thinly traded present a problem when intraday inferences are 
made. Thus firms that averaged less than ten trades a day are removed from the sample. 
Closing price < $5 and > $100 - Requiring the closing price to be higher than $5 ensures that small 
trades will not exceed 2,000 shares even for the lowest priced stocks. Restricting the price to $100 
ensures the cost of the smallest round lot is less than $10,000. 
Industry exclusions - Firms in certain industries either do not report earnings (closed-end mutual 
funds, real estate investment trusts) or report earnings that are subject to regulatory reviews 
(utilities). These are excluded. 
announcements of changes in dividend policy [Patell and Wolfson (1984)], 117 
such announcements were also identified and controlled for in the analysis. 
The Value Line Investment Survey forecast of quarterly earnings per share 
(EPS) from the most recent issue immediately preceding the announcement date 
is used to proxy for market expectations about earnings. To ensure the EPS is 
calculated consistently, the actual reported EPS from the DJNS was also 
checked against the actual EPS reported in the Value Line issue immediately 
following the announcement. In case of differences, the Value Line figure is used. 
In 1988, the Broad Tape operated from around 7:45 a.m. to around 6:45 p.m., 
so an announcement may occur before the market opens or after the market is 
closed. Given the focus of this study on the intraday dissemination process, only 
announcements made during trading hours are included, although the potential 
confounding effects of the other announcements are controlled for by excluding 
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them from the nonannouncement control sample.” When an earnings 
announcement is expected but not found in the DJNS, it is located in the Wall 
Street Journal Index. Since the exact times of such announcements are not 
known, they were excluded from the analysis. However, to control for their effect 
on trading activities, the three days centered on the Wall Street Journal an- 
nouncement date were removed from the analysis. Similarly, when the an- 
nouncement of a dividend change occurred within three days of an earnings 
announcement, days 0 to $2 relative to each announcement were removed 
from the analysis. After removing these confounding events, a total of 607 
intraday earnings announcements remained. Of these announcements 63% 
occurred before 12:30 p.m., with the highest concentration (12% of total) occur- 
ring in the half-hour interval lO:OO-lo:30 a.m. However, there is no pronounced 
clustering in any particular half-hour interval. 
A total of 4,076,190 trades (approximately one sixth of total NYSE trades 
during 1988) were transacted by the sample firms. Using a $10,000 value 
threshold, 1,833,363 trades (45.0% of total trades in the sample firms) were 
classified as small, 98.2% of all small trades are below $10,000 in value and 
95.2% (97.0%) are 500 (900) shares or less. 
4. Statistical tests 
The basic measure of volume used throughout this study is: 
f‘l = 
No. of firm i trades of size z during period t 
Total no. of firm i trades of size z during year 
x 100, 
where z is a trade size indicator such that: z = s signifies small trades as 
determined by the $10,000 firm-specific threshold, z = 1 signifies large trades as 
determined by the $10,000 threshold, and z = a signifies all trades. 
A share-based volume metric was also used in sensitivity tests. Since the key 
findings of the study are not affected by the choice of the volume metric, only the 
results based onp$ are reported here. 
A modified version of the Pate11 and Wolfson (1984) variance test is used to 
infer statistical significance. The actual procedures taken are as follows. First, 
over a control sample of nonannouncement periods (periods that exclude all 
dividend and earnings announcements), the multinominal frequency distribu- 
tion of trading volume is computed for each firm, each size stratum, and each 
‘*In light of the Patell and Wolfson (1982) finding that good news tends to be released during the 
day and bad news during hours when the market is closed, this procedures will likely remove more 
bad news announcements than good news announcements. However, separate examination of the 
remaining good news and bad news releases should mitigate against any selection bias. 
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half-hour interval of the trading day. Since there are 13 half-hour intervals per 
day and 3 size strata, 39 separate frequency distributions are computed for each 
firm. For each distribution, the sample median value (m;) and the top quartile 
value (q$) are computed, together with the probability that a random draw 
from the distribution will exceed its sample median (PMTt) or its first quartile 
value (PQe). The subscript k = 1, . . , 13 indicates the time period of the day, 
the subscripts z and i indicate the firm and size class. If volume measures were 
continuous, PM;, and PQ;, would be 0.5 and 0.25, respectively. Unfortunately 
volume measures are discrete and over small time intervals these measures can 
be quite coarse, so that more than one observation may assume the sample 
median or first quartile value. To ensure these differences in the reference 
distributions are accounted for, separate PM;, and PQFt values are determined 
for each reference distribution. 
To aggregate across firms, a Normal approximation to a generalized form of 
the Binomial test is used. Under the null hypothesis of zero volume effect, the 
probability that an observed volume will exceed its nonevent median (first 
quartile) is PMFt (PQ;,). Thus, the total expected number of observed values 
which exceed their corresponding medians (first quartiles) is simply the sum of 
the PM:, (PQ;,) values. In large samples, the following statistics are distributed 
approximately Normal (0,l): 
YMedf = 
YQn: = 
J ; pQ?t (1.0 - f'Q:) 
where VMf (VQ:) is the actual number of observations that exceeded its median 
(first quartile) value in size stratum z and event period r (r = - 13 to + 38). The 
subtraction of 0.5 from the numerator is a correction for continuity [see 
Snedecor and Cochran (1980, p. 119)]. 
To compute VMF ( VQ:), all announcements are aligned in event time. For 
each half-hour interval in the event window, the observed trading volume of 
each firm is compared to the median (first quartile) of the corresponding 
nonevent distribution. VM: ( VQ:) is the total number of announcements which 
exceed the median (first quartile) value. 
JAE F 
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The test above measures the pervasiveness of the abnormal volume reaction 
in each time interval over the event window, but does not offer an estimate of the 
magnitude of the abnormal volume. This is provided by the following mean 
abnormal volume (MA V) and cumulative mean abnormal volume (CMA V) 
measures: 
CMAV; = i MAVj, 
j=-13 
wheref$ is the mean volume measure across all nonannouncement days for firm 
i, time period k (k = 1, . . . , 13) and trade size z; n, is the number of observations 
in event interval r (r = - 13, . , + 38). 
5. Results 
5.1. Volume reaction 
Fig. 1 shows the mean abnormal volume (MA V) for the large and small trade 
size groups. The shadings for each column indicates the significance levels for 
the z-statistics.r3 The vertical height of each column indicates the magnitude of 
the MA V in each time period. For reference, it is helpful to note that the average 
trading volume in each half hour, unconditional on an earnings event, is 0.0304. 
The results show a much stronger reaction from the large trade stratum. In the 
large trades, the MAV for the 0 and + 1 intervals is over 100% of the normal 
volume of trade. In contrast, the MAV in the same two intervals in the small 
trade stratum is roughly 50% of the normal volume of trade. Thus, a greater 
proportion of the total annual large trades are concentrated around earnings 
announcements. This is at least consistent with the survey evidence that small 
individual investors focus less on earnings news than institutional investors. 
Even within the four-day event window, there is evidence that the intraday 
pattern of abnormal volume differs across the two size classes. Fig. 1 shows that 
large trades are more concentrated on the Broad Tape release time, while small 
trades tend to be more dispersed across the next three trading days. To provide 
a more direct comparison of the adjustment paths, the mean abnormal volume 
(MA V) for each time interval is divided by the total cumulative mean abnormal 
volume (CMA V) for the 52 event intervals. Fig. 2 plots the CMAV adjustment 
paths for each size stratum and reports the time required to reach lo%, 25%, 
r31n reading the figures, it is helpful to keep in mind that significance levels are based on the 
proportion of announcements that exceed the medians of their reference distributions. Thus, a statis- 
tically significant reaction is one that is broadly-based, not one in which the MA Vexceeds a critical 
value. It is therefore possible for some large MAV to be insignificant and some small MAV to be 
significant. 
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50%, 75%, and 90% of the full CMAV adjustment. This analysis provides 
a sense of how quickly the abnormal volume manifests itself in each size class 
over the event window. Some care needs to be taken in interpreting these results, 
since they are clearly sensitive to the size of the event window. However, fig. 2 
suggests that the abnormal volume in large trades is more focused on the Broad 
Tape news release. When the same procedures were applied to portfolios formed 
on the basis of firm size (large and small) and trading frequency (high and low), 
the findings were similar. 
5.2. Directional reaction (order imbalance) 
As indicated earlier, this paper employs a new algorithm that allows a differ- 
ent direction measure for the two size strata. A description of the algorithm, 
together with summary statistics on the number of trades classified by each step, 
is presented in the appendix. While the exact accuracy of this algorithm will be 
sample-specific, the empirical and analytical tests in Lee and Ready (1991) 
suggest a success rate of approximately 95%. For a more detailed explanation of 
the algorithm, as well as tests of its performance, see Lee and Ready (1991). 
News is classifiable as good or bad only in relation to prior investor expec- 
tations. In this study several empirical models of investor expectations for 
earnings are used. The first assumes the Value Line forecast is a reasonable 
proxy for investors’ expectation of earnings. Announcements of earnings higher 
(lower) than the Value Line forecast are deemed good (bad) news. Announce- 
ments for which there is either no Value Line forecast, or where the forecast is 
equal to the actual earnings, are considered ‘neutral news’. The second model 
classifies the announcements based on the price change around the event. 
Announcements accompanied by a price increase (decrease) in the first hour of 
trading after the release are deemed good (bad) news.14 To avoid noise intro- 
duced by the bid-ask spread, the mean of the bid and ask prices (the ‘mid- 
spread’) is used in computing the price change. The third model assumes 
investors’ expectations of earnings follow a seasonal random walk, so that 
earnings higher (lower) than that reported in the corresponding quarter in the 
prior year is deemed good (bad) news. 
Since the key results are similar using all three models, only the findings 
for the Value Line forecast are reported here. Table 2 summarizes the an- 
nouncements that are classified as ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘neutral’ on the basis of the 
“Announcement ‘misclassifications’ are less likely if the price change is computed over a longer 
time period. However, since the direction measure is related to price changes, such a classification 
scheme would render the results difficult to interpret. For example, when announcements are 
divided on the basis of the sign of the one-day return, strong directional imbalances in the direction 
of the price change are found for the full trading day after release. In effect, this result is 
predetermined. 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics for good news, bad news, or indeterminable announcements, classified on the 
basis of the sign of the Value Line forecast error. 
Full sample 
Number of announcements 607 
Number of announcements by sign 
of the price change in the first hour 
of trading: 
Positive price change 237 
Negative price change 197 
No price change 173 
Average one-hour return 
after announcement 0.09% 
Average one-day return 
after announcement - 0.06% 





140 62 35 
64 100 33 
57 78 38 
0.52% - 0.25% - 0.15% 
0.57% - 0.63% - 0.14% 
Value Line forecast error. As indicated, the mean one-day returns are negative 
(positive) for bad (good) news under either classification. 
The most direct way to compute an aggregate direction measure is to align the 
announcements in event time and sum the number of buys and sells for each 
time interval across all announcements. This ‘pooling’ approach, which is 
similar to the Pate11 and Wolfson (1984) test for price continuations, would be 
acceptable if the observations were independent. Unfortunately, at the transac- 
tion level, there is strong positive serial correlation in the occurrence of buys and 
sells. Thus, when a single firm-interval contains more than one trade, these 
observations are positively correlated even during nonevent periods. In the 
presence of positive correlation, the variance estimate in the above methods will 
underestimate the actual variance. This can result in inflated test statistics. 
To circumvent the serial correlation problem, the trades for each firm in each 
half-hour interval are aggregated into a single direction measure: 
FDIR$ = 
FBU Yfr - FSELLft 
TRD; 
x 100, 
where FBU Yft (FSELLZ) is the number of buy (sell) orders for firm i, trade size 
z, and time interval t, and TRD: is the total number of trades of size z for firm 
i during the year. FDIRFt is a frequency-based measure of the direction of 
trading in period t (a shares-based measure was also computed and results were 
similar). Higher values of FDIRf, correspond to a higher proportion of buys to 
sells. Deflating by the total trading activity for the firm allows for aggregation 
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a procedure completely analogous to the generalized binomial test used earlier, 
the multinomial distribution for FDIRft is computed over nonevent periods and 
the actual measure over the event period is compared to this distribution.15 
To provide an estimate of the magnitude of the abnormal order imbalance in 
each time interval across the event window, the following mean abnormal 
directional imbalance measure (MAD) is computed: 
MAD; = $ ,$, (FDIR;, - FDIRL), 
where FDIR; is the mean direction measure across all nonannouncement days 
for firm . , 13) and trade size z, rn: is the number of 
announcements for which there was at least one size z trade in event period 
r(r= -13,...,+38). 
Fig. 3 presents the mean abnormal directional imbalance measure (MAD;) 
for large and small trades when the actual earnings exceed the Value Line 
forecast (‘good’ news). Also plotted in the lower graph is the price reaction, as 
measured by the mean abnormal return for each half-hour interval over the 
event window. As explained earlier, intraday returns are computed using the 
midpoint of the bid-ask price at the end of each half hour. The abnormal return 
is the actual return minus the mean of the reference distribution for that firm and 
time-of-day. The figure plotted is the equal-weighted mean abnormal return 
across all announcements. 
As expected, the price reaction to earnings in excess of Value Line forecasts is 
positive. The mean abnormal return in the half hour containing the Broad Tape 
release of ‘good news’ is just over 0.5% and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level (two-tailed). Consistent with prior findings [e.g., Pate11 and Wolfson 
(1984)], this price reaction dissipates quickly and is significantly positive only 
for interval 0. 
The direction imbalance in the large trade stratum is significantly positive 
in time interval 0, suggesting abnormally high buying activities. However, like 
the price reaction, this response is extremely short-lived, lasting only 30 minutes. 
In the small trade stratum, there is also a strong positive reaction in interval 0. 
However, unlike the large trade stratum, abnormally high buying imbalances 
are observed for at least the next 13 intervals. Since the price has already 
adjusted to the information shock, the protracted buying by small traders seems 
i50ne important modification is that FDIRf is defined only when there is trading of size z in 
period r. In other words, zero trade intervals are not included in either the computation of the 
nonevent distribution or in the event period analysis. The problem with including zero trade 
intervals is that in periods of higher volume (such as immediately after an announcement), the 
probability of exceeding the nonevent distribution median increases even when there is no direc- 
tional movement, simply as a result of fewer nontrading observations. 
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to suggest that, on average, the small traders believe the new equilibrium price is 
too low. However, the evidence is also consistent with the small traders system- 
atically lagging the market response. There is also some weak indication of 
directional imbalances in the preannouncement period which is positive for 
small trades but negative for large trades. 
Fig. 4 reports the price reaction and directional imbalance when the news is 
‘bad’ based on the Value Line forecast error. As expected, the price adjustment is 
negative and occurs largely in the first half hour. Once again, the order imbal- 
ance in large trades is strong in interval 0, only this time it is negative, indicating 
abnormally high selling. The duration of the large trader reaction seems slightly 
longer for bad news, but is still essentially undetectable after 90 minutes.“j 
Surprisingly, there is no reaction from the small trade stratum in the first five 
time intervals after the announcement. From interval 6 onwards, however, there 
appears to be a period of protracted buying in the small trades. Again, this is 
consistent with the interpretation that small traders deem the new equilibrium 
price to be too low. It is not consistent, however, with the explanation that small 
traders systematically lag the market response. 
To ensure the surprising results in figs. 3 and 4 are not due to a misspecified 
statistical test, two calibration tests were performed. First, for each announce- 
ment that exceeded the most recent Value Line forecast, an observation was 
generated using the same firm and time of day, but a random announcement 
date. A similar test was performed for a portfolio of ‘bad news’ announcements. 
The results, not reported, show no significant patterns in the imbalance 
measures in either random sample. In particular, it is not the case that the small 
trade stratum is prone to abnormal buying. It is also not the case that statis- 
tically significant observations occur more frequently in the small trade stratum. 
To further characterize this propensity of small traders to buy around 
earnings releases, I examined a sample of announcements which either were not 
classifiable by Value Line or did not result in a price change in the first hour of 
trading. The price and directional response of large and small trades is 
documented for this ‘neutral’ news subsample in fig. 5. 
There is no significant price reaction at the time of the news release, although 
the one-day return for this portfolio is slightly negative. Large trades also do not 
display any significant directional volume imbalance during the event period. 
However, in the small trades the now familiar pattern of buying emerges once 
again. There is some evidence that for this sample the unusual buying activity 
begins on day - 1. 
‘% time interval I, the mean abnormal buy measure is strongly negative, but the z-statistic based 
on the median test is not significant. In fact, the z-statistic based on the quartile cutoff is strongly 
significant - suggesting a sizeable number of announcements exceeded their reference quartiles, but 
the reaction is not broad-based by the median test. 
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5.3. Sensitivity of results to,firm size and trading volume 
Since small firms tend to have a higher proportion of small trades, the 
question arises as to whether the earlier results are a small firm phenomenon. 
This question is also of concern in light of prior findings that earnings an- 
nouncements of small firms are associated with stronger price and volume 
reactions [Freeman (1987), Atiase (1985), and Bamber (1987)]. The weaker 
reaction in small trades seems, at first blush, to be inconsistent with the stronger 
volume reaction expected in small firms (which have a greater proportion of 
small trades). Similarly, firms that trade infrequently experience a greater pro- 
portion of small trades, so that the small trade effect may be driven solely by 
firms with lower trading volume. 
Tables 3 and 4 report summary results for subsamples formed on the basis of 
firm size (defined in terms of the total market capitalization at the beginning of 
the year) and trading volume (defined in terms of the average number of trades 
per day). Results for the full sample are also reported in the first column for 
comparison. The small firms are, on average, less than one tenth the size of large 
firms. There is also a greater proportion of small trades in small firms (63.9%) 
than in large firms (38.7%). 
Consistent with prior findings, table 3 shows that the volume reaction 
(CMA V) is stronger for small firms than for large firms. This holds for both 
trade sizes, so both small and large traders respond more strongly in the small 
firms. The results are similar for the trading volume portfolios, as the CMAV 
reaction is stronger in the low volume firms than in the high volume firms. 
Table 3 also shows that the reaction in small trades is ‘weaker’ than the reaction 
in large trades for all firms and for both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news subsamples. 
Table 4 reports the cumulative directional volume reaction (CMAD) over 
a four-day event interval. The CMAD measure is the mean abnormal directional 
imbalance, summed over half-hour intervals - 13 to + 38 relative to the Broad 
Tape release time. The results show directional volume (CMAD) is not signifi- 
cantly positive for large trades in any of the portfolios, even for the ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ news samples. Apparently the abrupt order imbalance in the half hour of 
the announcement is diluted over the four-day trading window, so the average 
CMAD is no longer significant. However, the same measure is significantly 
positive for the small trades in all portfolios. The actual magnitude of the small 
trade CMAD measure is lower in the large firms and the high volume firms, but 
this is consistent with the lower overall abnormal volume (CMAV) in these 
firms. It appears small traders do not respond as strongly in large and more 
frequently traded firms, but to the extent there is a small trade reaction, the 
trades are primarily buys. 
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Table 3 
Abnormal volume by trade size, firm size, and trading volume. 
291 
Firm size Trading volume 
(market capitalization) (trades per day) 
Full 
sample Small Large Low High 
Firm statistics 
Number of firms 230 115 115 115 115 
Average size at beginning of 
year ($million) 2,003 267 3,738 402 3,603 
Average trading volume 
(trades per day) 70.0 27.6 113.9 21.4 120.1 
Proportion of small trades 45.0% 63.9% 38.7% 42.0% 60.6% 
All  earnings 
announcements 607 298 309 298 309 
Abnormal volume 
( C M A  V) a 
All trades 0.224** 0.313"* 0.137'* 0.300** 0.147"* 
Large trades 0.285** 0.286** 0.188"* 0.390** 0.180"* 
Small trades 0.162"* 0.260** 0.067** 0.230** 0.094** 
Good news b 
announcements 261 116 145 113 148 
Abnormal volume 
( C M A V )  ~ 
All trades 0.217"* 0.344** 0.114"* 0.316"* 0.141"* 
Large trades 0.276** 0.420** 0.144"* 0.400** 0.165"* 
Small trades 0.165"* 0.306** 0.048** 0.258** 0.090** 
Bad news b 
announcements 240 116 124 116 124 
Abnormal volume 
( C M A V )  a 
All trades 0.246** 0.335** 0.163"* 0.349** 0.150"* 
Large trades 0.331"* 0.414"* 0.231"* 0.463** 0.189"* 
Small trades 0.176"* 0.270** 0.082** 0.258** 0.093** 
aCumulative mean abnormal volume ( C M A  V) is the sum of the mean abnormal volume for each 
half-hour interval from - 1 3  to + 38 relative to the Broad Tape announcement time, expressed as 
a percent of total annual trades in that size class. As reference, the average 'normal' volume over the 
same time interval (four trading days) is 1.58% of total annual trades. Single (*) and double (**) 
asterisks indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels in two-tailed tests. 
bAnnouncements of earnings that exceed the most recent Value Line forecast are deemed 'good 
news', announcements of earnings that are less than the most recent Value Line forecast are deemed 
'bad news'. 
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Table 4 
Abnormal directional volume by trade size, firm size, and trading volume. 
Firm size Trading volume 
(market capitalization) (trades per day) 
Full 
sample Small Large Low High 
Firm statist ics 
Number of firms 230 115 115 115 115 
Average size at beginning of 
year ($million) 2,003 267 3,738 402 3,603 
Average trading volume 
(trades per day) 70.0 27.6 113.9 21.4 120.1 
Proportion of small trades 45.0% 63.9% 38.7% 42.0% 60.6% 
All  earnings 
announcements  607 298 309 298 309 
Abnormal direction ( C M A D )  a 
All trades 0.063** 0.108"* 0.030* 0.116"* 0.098** 
Large trades - 0.030 - 0.112 0.002 - 0.081 - 0.013 
Small trades 0.144"* 0.217"* 0.090** 0.246** 0.080** 
Good news b 
announcements  261 116 145 113 148 
Abnormal direction ( C M A D )  a 
All trades 0.038 0.061 0.021 0.060 0.024 
Large trades - 0.024 - 0.112 0.000 - 0.121 - 0.002 
Small trades 0.106"* 0.166"* 0.071"* 0.199"* 0.064** 
Bad news b 
announcements  240 116 124 116 124 
Abnormal direction ( C M  A D  ) ~ 
All trades 0.067** 0.123"* 0.028 0.141"* 0.020 
Large trades - 0.058 - 0.123 - 0.009 - 0.061 - 0.040 
Small trades 0.168"* 0.268** 0.095** 0.304** 0.087** 
aCumulative mean abnormal direction ( C M A D )  is the sum of the mean abnormal direction for 
each half-hour interval from - 13 to +38 relative to the Broad Tape announcement time. The mean 
abnormal direction is the number of buys minus the number of sells, expressed as a percent of total 
annual trades in that size class. As reference, the average 'normal' volume over the same time interval 
(four trading days) is 1.58% of total annual trades. Single (*) and double (**) asterisks indicate 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels in two-tailed tests. 
bAnnouncements of earnings that exceed the most recent Value Line forecast are deemed 'good 
news', announcements of earnings that are less than the most recent Value Line forecast are deemed 
'bad news'. 
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5.4. Results aligned by time-of-day 
The slower response of the small traders may be attributable to their use of 
a secondary information source, such as the Wall Street Journal, which is 
typically made available prior to the market open on day + 1 relative to the 
Broad Tape announcement. Fig. 6 shows the mean abnormal volume for each 
half-hour interval of each day for days - 1 to +2 for both large and small 
trades. There was little abnormal volume in either size class on day - 1. The 
abnormal volume on day 0 is fairly evenly distributed for large trades but seems 
stronger for small trades in the afternoon. Consistent with an overnight process- 
ing of information or a response to a secondary information source, volume in 
the first half hour of trading on day + 1 is abnormally high for both trade strata. 
These findings no doubt understate the actual reaction, since the opening trade 
of the day has been eliminated. Again, the abnormal volume persists through 
day +2 in both size strata. 
Fig. 7 presents the mean abnormal directional imbalance measures by time- 
of-day for all intraday earnings releases. The large trade directional response is 
mixed for all four days, but the small trade buying activities appear to be 
concentrated on days - 1, + 1, and +2. The strongest buying imbalance 
appears in the small trades during the morning of day + 1. Although not 
reported, dividing the sample by good, bad, and neutral news produces very 
similar results. In each case, significant abnormal buying in small trades is 
observed for days + 1 and +2. On day - 1, the evidence is mixed for good 
news releases, but abnormal buying in small trades is observed for bad and 
neutral news. 
6. Summary 
Capital-market-based accounting research has been characterized by two 
themes: the sophistication of the market to accounting numbers and the in- 
formativeness of accounting news releases. On the one hand, stock prices 
anticipate earnings news [Ball and Brown (1968), Pate11 and Wolfson (1981)], 
respond quickly to earnings releases [Patell and Wolfson (1984)], and are not 
misled by accounting changes [Ball (1972), Biddle and Lindahl (1982)]. On the 
other hand, price and volume reactions associated with accounting releases are 
widely interpreted as evidence of their usefulness to investors [Beaver (1968), 
Morse (1981), Bamber (1986, 1987)]. Yet these findings have been based on 
aggregate measures that implicitly assume market participants are a homoge- 
neous group. Little is known about the sophistication of small traders and the 
usefulness of earnings releases to these traders. 
This paper presents evidence on the differential intraday volume reactions in 
the large and small trade strata around earnings announcements. The evidence 
shows the small trade reaction is both weaker (as a proportion of annual trades 
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in each trade size) and slower (in terms of the manifestation of abnormal volume 
relative to the Broad Tape release time). In addition, while ‘good’ (‘bad’) 
news triggers a brief but intense buying (selling) imbalance in the large trades, 
small trades are characterized by a persistent period of unusually high buying 
activity for both good and bad news releases. Collectively, the evidence 
suggests heterogeneous behavior in the instigators of small and large trades. If 
trade size is a credible proxy for individual and institutional activities, the 
evidence suggests these two groups differ in their reaction to the same earnings 
news. 
The surprising propensity of small traders to be net buyers during the 
earnings announcement period does not seem to be readily explained by existing 
theories. For example, in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) some traders trade for 
liquidity reasons but have discretion over the timing of their trades. In that 
model, an intraday clustering of trades arises endogenously because discretion- 
ary liquidity traders find it advantageous to time their trades to coincide with 
the activities of informed traders. If we assume small traders are generally less 
informed, they may attempt to reduce their informational disadvantage by 
delaying trade execution until after earnings announcements. This results in 
increased liquidity-based (noninformational) trading in the post-announcement 
period. However, there is no directional prediction in this theory. In particular, 
there is no reason to expect this increased volume to be predominantly buys. 
Nor does the theory explain the small traders’ propensity to buy the day before 
the announcement, when there is little excess volume. 
One concern is that these findings are due to the breaking up of large trades 
during fast trading after an earnings announcement. While incoming trades are 
not generally split in the processing, it is certainly possible that some small 
trades after an earnings release derive from the splitting of larger trades. 
However, the buy/sell classification algorithm is such that small trades created 
by the breaking up of large trades are directionally the same as the large trades. 
This is not what we observe, since small trades are predominantly buys while 
large trades display no such pattern. 
It has also been suggested that the small trade behavior may be attributable 
to systematic differences in risk preferences. Since risk is known to increase 
during earnings announcement periods, small traders who are extremely 
risk-averse might sell before the announcements and buy afterwards to avoid the 
risk of holding the security over the announcement period. The pre-announce- 
ment selling is more dispersed and therefore is not detectable while the 
post-announcement buying is more concentrated and is observed. Although this 
strategy involves trading costs, it has been argued that for discretionary liquidity 
traders in the Admati and Pfleiderer sense, these costs are not germane to 
the decision to trade. For these traders, it may be advantageous to delay 
purchases of a security until after the announcement, when the risk of ownership 
is lower. 
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This explanation has several potential problems. First, there is no evidence 
that risk preferences are systematically different between large and small traders. 
The extant evidence shows a high concentration of small individual traders in 
such high-beta securities as small firms, over-the-counter stocks, and initial 
public offerings, as well as low-beta securities such as utilities [Lee, Shleifer, and 
Thaler (1991)]. So, if risk is defined in a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
context, small traders do not seem systematically more risk-averse. If large 
and small traders are both risk-averse, the obvious question is why there 
isn’t a similar propensity to buy in the large trade stratum. Second, contrary 
to the theory, the abnormal buying by small traders begins before the Broad 
Tape announcement date. Third, while the phenomenon is pervasive in 
the data, there is no anecdotal evidence of this practice among individual 
investors. 
Another explanation is that the buys and sells of small traders are the results 
of different decision processes. Specifically, small investor buy decisions are 
associated with news events which bring the security to small investors’ atten- 
tion, while sell decisions are driven more by consumption or liquidity needs. 
Events such as a Wall Street Journal article spur interest and elicit higher buys 
regardless of the nature of the news. In other words, it isn’t the news content of 
the event per se, but the attention given to the firm, that triggers the small trade 
response we observe. One variation of this explanation includes the asymmetric 
cost of short-selling. Specifically, media coverage may spur both large and small 
traders to action, but small trader sells are curtailed by the higher proportional 
costs of short-selling in small amounts. This explanation implies that the 
propensity toward buys is not specific to earnings news and will appear in small 
trades for any announcement that receives sufficient media coverage. Given our 
current understanding of small investor behavior, it is difficult to determine 
whether these buy/sell patterns are economically rational or in some sense 
suboptimal. 
One explanation that raises serious questions about the small traders’ dis- 
cernment is based on the observation that small traders rely heavily on advisors 
in their investment decisions [SRI (1987)]. It is known that financial analysts 
and brokers make far more buy recommendations than sell recommenda- 
tions [Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum, and Lease (1979) report that, based on 
a sample of 6,000 recommendations, six buy recommendations are issued for 
every one sell recommendation]. If brokerage houses and other advisory servi- 
ces routinely contact their clients around the time of earnings announcements, it 
is possible that the reaction observed is a response to the advice from their 
advisors. Since the advice is heavily one-sided, an abnormal buying imbalance 
results. 
Clearly, many questions remain. If indeed there exists a distinct individual 
segment in the investing community, with its own information needs and trading 
patterns, the implications for accounting and finance research could be 
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far-reaching. It is my hope and expectation that this study will stimulate further 
thought in this direction. 
Appendix: Inferring trade direction 
The direction of individual trades is inferred by the following algorithm from 
Lee and Ready (1991). Only NYSE-issued quotes which are BBO-eligible were 
used (a quote is BBO-eligible if it qualifies for the National Association of 





Current Quote Match - If the trade price is at the bid or ask and the current 
quote was not revised within the last five seconds, then the direction of the 
trade is determined by the current quote (i.e., a buy if it’s at the ask and a sell 
if it’s at the bid). 
Delayed Quote Match ~ If the current quote is less than five seconds old, it is 
ignored and the trade price is compared to the bid and ask prices of the 
previous quote. 
Outside the Spread ~ If the trade price, when compared to the quote in either 
step 1 or 2, is greater than the ask (less than the bid), then the transaction is 
deemed a buy (sell). 
Tick Test - If the trade is at the midpoint of the spread or if a BBO-eligible 
quote is not available, the tick test is used to determine trade direction. In 
other words, if the last price change was positive (negative), then this trade is 
Classified by: 
Table A.1 







Current quote match 
Delayed quote match 
Outside spread 
Tick test 
Proximity to bid/ask 
Total 
As % of total trades” 
in each size stratum 
1,157,196 1,214,563 627,600 616,819 530,196 657,744 
155,584 150,503 128,571 118,901 27,013 31,602 
11,025 13,363 6,682 7,326 4,343 6,037 
466.336 431,559 265,484 232,634 200,852 198,925 
185,880 182,267 112,898 103,134 72,982 79,133 
1976621 ) 2 052 255 ) 1141235 ) 1078814 ) 835,386 973,441 
49.06% 50.94% 51.41% 48.59% 46.18% 53.82% 
“A total of 47,314 trades (or 1.2% of all trades) were not determinable in direction and were 
excluded from the summary above. Note that unless offsetting behavior occurs in the submission of 
limit orders, these statistics indicate small traders were net sellers during 1988 while large traders 
were net buyers. This is at least consistent with the market wisdom that small investors were largely 
bearish on the market after the 1987 crash - despite the strong overall market during 1988. 
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deemed a buy (sell). All out-of-sequence trades are ignored in updating price 
changes. 
(5) Proximity to Bid/Ask - If a trade is between the spread but not at the 
midpoint, then the trade is classified according to its proximity to the bid or 
ask price. Trades at prices above the midpoint are classified as sells and 
trades at prices below the midpoint are classified as buys. 
(6) Indeterminable ~ This classification is assigned to a trade when none of the 
above conditions apply. Specifically, it applies to the first trade of the year 
for each firm and any trade which is reported out-of-sequence. 
When the procedures above were applied to the trades in the sample firms, the 
number of trades classified by each step is as shown in table A.l. 
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